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This paper presents a new theory, called Preference Cloud Theory, of 
decision-making under uncertainty. This new theory provides an 
explanation for empirically-observed Preference reversals. Central to the 
theory is the incorporation of preference imprecision which arises because 
of individuals’ vague understanding of numerical probabilities. We combine 
this concept with the use of the Alpha model (which builds on Hurwicz’s 
criterion) and construct a simple model which helps us to understand 
various anomalies discovered in the experimental economics literature that 
standard models cannot explain.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Suppose you are asked to state your subjective value for a lottery ticket which gives 10 dollars with a 
probability of 0.3 and zero otherwise: Can you pin your value down to a single precise number or do 
you end up with a range of values? Our preference imprecision argument states that individuals 
most likely end up having an interval; preferences are not as precise as standard theory presumes 
(for evidence, see: Butler and Loomes, 1988, 2007, 2011; Dubourg et al, 1994, 1996; and Morrison, 
1998). Such imprecision might explain observed anomalies of standard theory (Butler and Loomes 
2011). Most importantly, imprecision might be the explanation of the anomalies, despite 
researchers’ efforts, in the last four decades, focusing on precise but non-standard preferences such 
as loss aversion.   
Suppose now you are assigned to be a buyer. You are most likely to state a value close to the lower 
bound of this range; the converse is true when you are assigned to be a seller. The model presented 
in this paper answers two key questions: what is the psychological mechanism behind the formation 
of this range?; how do individuals select one value from this range? It also shows how the 
incorporation of imprecision can provide an explanation for preference reversals. 
For the first question our theory proposes that imprecision arises due to the decision-maker’s vague 
understanding of the probabilities involved.  The empirical support for this assertion comes from the 
psychophysics literature; see Budescu et al (1988).  In an experiment reported by them subjects 
were asked to state bids for lotteries; in the lotteries the probabilities were represented numerically, 
graphically or verbally. The results suggested that bids and attractiveness ratings are almost identical 
under the different representations (See Budescu and Wallsten (1990) and Bisantz et al (2005) for 
further evidence). Wallsten and Budescu (1995) explain that the similarity of behavior under 
different representation modes is due to similarities in the vague understanding of probabilities. We 
therefore argue that a numerical, objective, probability corresponds to a range of probabilities and 
subjects use this range in their calculations2. There is also implicit evidence from Plott and Zeiler 
(2005) and Isoni et al (2011) who find that the endowment effect is observed only for the lottery 
tickets, but not for ordinary market goods such as mugs and candies. 
Zimmer (1984) introduced a useful insight from an evolutionary perspective: he noted that the 
probability concept in a numerical sense is a relatively new concept, appearing as recently as the 17th 
century. However, people were communicating uncertainty via verbal expressions long before 
probability was codified in mathematical terms. Zimmer further suggested that people process 
uncertainty in a verbal manner and make their decisions based on this processed information, not 
on the numerical information. We therefore assume that decision makers map any given objective 
probability into an interval. This implies that people end up with a range of expected utilities (EUs) 
and they do not have prior knowledge about their “true” EU from this range. For the second 
question, pinning down this range to a single value can be modelled as decision problem under 
ambiguity. We use the Alpha Model (embodying Hurwicz’s criterion) to provide a valuation of the 
prospect, given as the weighted average of the worst and the best possible EU. The next section 
formalises these ideas.  
2. Theory  
 
In order to give the intuition of the theory we focus on two-outcome lotteries. Let S be a finite state 
space, with elements 1s and 2s ; let 1x and 2x be the corresponding consequences. We assume that
   1 2u x u x , where  .u is the individual’s Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. For each state 
there is an objective probability; call them p and1 p . The crucial point of our theory is that 
individuals perceive these probabilities vaguely, and hence p is mapped to a range:  ,p p   . As 
far as the individual is concerned, the worst situation is when probability p  is allocated to state 1s  
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 Verbal expressions include “rare”, “very likely” etc. Each expression can be interpreted as a range of 
probabilities that may vary from individual to individual. 
(and probability1 p   to state 2s , and the best situation is when probability p  is allocated to 
state 1s (and probability1 p   to state 2s ). So the worst and best expected utilities are 
       1 21p u x p u x     and        1 21p u x p u x     respectively.   
At this point PCT uses the Alpha Max-Min criterion to evaluate the lottery. This gives 
                  1 2 1 21 1 1EU p u x p u x p p u x p u x                         (1) 
One can think of such a decision-maker as a mixture of a pessimist and an optimist: of the time he 
or she assumes the worst, and1  of the time the best. 
The parameter  we call the imprecision level; our theory postulates that it is a function of p (the 
objective probability) and (the individual-specific sophistication level). A relatively unsophisticated 
individual would display a relatively high imprecision  . For example, stock brokers and gamblers 
who are expected to be more familiar with the concept of probability exhibit lower imprecision than 
the ordinary man.  
As far as the shape of  ,p  is concerned we assume that individuals exhibit no imprecision if the 
probability is 0 or 1 since the events occurring with these probabilities are not probabilistic events in 
daily language, that is, the event either never happens or always happens. Secondly, imprecision 
reaches a maximum at 0.5 because it implies the event is neither likely nor unlikely, this 
‘incommensurability’ makes it difficult to derive a meaning from this probability. Finally, for 
simplicity we assume that  ,p  is symmetric around 0.5p .  
3. Explaining Preference Reversals 
We show how preference reversals can arise with our model. We illustrate using the CRRA utility 
function for  .u  
                                                                                       ( ) au z z                                                                           (2)  
For 0a , the function is concave, implying risk aversion. For simplicity, we focus on P and $ bets 
that give either a positive payoff or zero: P-bet  , ;0x p  and $-bet  , ;0y q with 0y x  and
1 0p q    where p  and q  are the winning probabilities, and x and y are the winning prizes of the 
P-bet and $-bet, respectively.  
If the individual prefers the P-bet over the $-bet in the choice task, we can write: 
    $EU P bet EU bet      (2) 
           1 1a a a ap x p x q y p y                            (3) 
Thus the critical value for  in determining whether the P-bet preferred to the $-bet is: 
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  (4) 
If the actual is greater than * the individual chooses the P-bet; if lower the $-bet.  
When we come to valuations we need to tell a different story. Let us consider willingness-to-accept. 
Take the P-bet. Imagine that the individual owns the P-bet and is asked the minimum amount for 
which he or she would sell it – the WTA. If it is sold the individual has WTA (presumably an amount 
less than x ), and the worst thing that can ‘happen’ to the individual is that the P-bet would have 
paid out x , and the best thing that can ‘happen’ to the individual is that the P-bet would have paid 
out 0. So the pessimist attaches weight p  to the possibility of getting x , while the optimist 
attaches weight p  . So we get 
        1 1a aP betu WTA p x p x   


             (5) 
Similarly, 
        1 $ 1
a a
betu WTA q y q y   


             (6) 
The critical value for   is: 
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If is greater ** the individual values the $-bet higher than the P-bet; if it is lower the P-bet is 
valued higher. 
We explore the parameters of PCT in three cases: risk neutral, risk averse and a risk loving. Consider 
Figure 2, where r  set to 1; P-bet  1.25,0.8;0 , $-bet  5,0.2;0 3 
Figure 1 
   
Risk Averse, a=0.7 Risk Neutral, a=1 Risk Lover, a=1,3 
 
 
The dashed line shows the ** boundary and the solid line is the * boundary. Above the dashed 
line the $-bet is valued higher and above the solid gray line the P-bet is chosen; the region between 
the two lines is called the consistency range where the chosen bet is valued more. For a risk-neutral 
individual, in the case of imprecision ( 0),  a standard Preference reversal occurs if 0.5,   when it 
is lower than 0.5, the model predicts a non-standard Preference reversal. For a risk-averse 
individual, in the consistency range individual chooses the P-Bet and values it higher; whereas for 
the risk loving case the $-Bet is chosen and valued more. This makes sense: the P-bet would be more 
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 For the imprecision level, we use    , 1 ,p p p     there is no particular reason behind choosing this, 
except it is simple and satisfies the assumptions of the theory. We normalize the expected value (EV) of the P 
bet by setting its payoff equal to1 / ;p r is the EV of the $ bet as a ratio of the EV of the P-bet. Therefore the 
winning prize of the $ bet equals / .r p  
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attractive for a risk-averse individual. Overall, in the case of imprecision ( 0),  a sufficiently high 
level of pessimism results in a standard Preference Reversal while optimism implies a non-standard 
Preference Reversal.  
Next we consider the case in which the winning probabilities remain the same, but the winning prize 
of the $-Bet varies. Figure 3 shows the critical bounds for three cases: 
Figure 2 
 
  
Risk Averse, a=0.7 
 
The dashed lines show the valuation boundary, and the solid lines show the choice boundary, for 
three levels of r (0.8,1,1.2). For a risk-averse decision-maker, the consistency range shrinks as r
increases up to a certain level. The parameter values to induce standard and non-standard 
preference reversals converge to the risk neutrality baseline case. However, above this critical level 
of ,r the consistency range favors the $-bet and it expands as r increases. Even if we increase the 
relative attractiveness of the $-bet to extreme values, the model predicts that both standard and 
non-standard preference reversals can be observed.  
 
 
 
0.0
0.3
0.5
0.8
1.0
0.01 0.21 0.41
α 
β 
Standard PR 
  non-Standard PR 
Consistency 
Range 
0
1
0 0.5 1
Valuation (r=0.8)
Valuation (r=1)
Valuation (r=1.2)
Choice (r=0.8)
Choice (r=1)
Choice (r=1.2)
4. Conclusion 
We demonstrated the intuition of the Preference Cloud Theory and explained the possible 
preference reversals. In the same manner other anomalies of EUT can be explained such as 
Endowment Effect and Allais Paradox. To best of our knowledge, this is the only theory that can 
explain anomalies in Expected Utility theory without incorporating the loss aversion notion of the 
Prospect Theory.  
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